This article discusses the issue of the democratic deficit and the legitimacy of European Union institutions, and, consequently, of the law they create. The text reflects on the EU as a special type of international organization and its related problem of legitimacy. Theoretical issues of the democratic deficit and legitimacy are discussed, enriched with a comparative presentation of the views of two outstanding intellectuals, one from each side of the Atlantic. The following part of the article presents practical attempts to respond to the problem of the democratic deficit and the legitimacy of the EU, undertaken both in the European Parliament and by European institutions and member states, in the form of the recently completed Conference on the Future of Europe (CoFoE).
Many political changes that have taken place across the world in the last decade have been connected with the spill-over of a new narrative in the public dimension. Among other things, this narrative has emphasized returning control over the public space to the people once again, revitalization of the democratic community, restraint on an expansion of judicial power over representational politics, and in many instances, a specific national approach to the questions of governance. These trends have gained the name "illiberal democracy", a description which Viktor Orban introduced into the language of political practice a few years later. Indeed, in many countries worldwide, from the United States of America (USA) during the presidency of Donald Trump, Central and Eastern Europe, to Turkey and Venezuela, it has been possible to observe changes which had the principal leitmotif to negate liberal democracy as the only possibility of organizing public space within the state. These trends are continuing, and there are no signs of them disappearing in the near future. The new dispensation in the USA under President Biden also does not guarantee an immediate return to the liberal internationalism of the 1990s. Political changes directed toward the constitutional space of the State have inspired researchers to consider the issues of new constitutionalism, new forms of democracy, and the rule of law beyond liberalism. This article is an attempt to transfer these considerations to the international level. The text aims to consider whether withdrawal from the liberal doctrine could also be observed on an international level and what these facts could mean for the intellectual project of constitutionalization of international law. Building upon reflections on constitutionalism and constitutionalization of international law, this text presents what has up until now been the mainstream understanding of international law as a liberal construct. This showcases the illiberal turn observed among certain countries as exemplified by the anti-liberal and realist language of their constitutional representatives. In this respect, this analysis is a modest contribution to the so far nascent field of sociology of international law. However, the main endeavor of this article is to unchain the notions of international liberalism and constitutionalization of international law as being popularly understood as two sides of the same coin. Consequently, the idea of political constitutionalism of international law is introduced. Seeing things from this perspective, this text focuses on the material rather than formal aspects of international law's constitutionalization. Within the stream of so called thick constitutionalism, there are a few elements listed with which the discussion about international law may continue to engage, if this law is to be considered as legitimate not only formally, but also substantially.
The judgment of the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) announced on November 19, 2019 in response to a preliminary reference from the Polish Supreme Court is of fundamental importance for the independence of courts and judges in EU countries, establishing a pillar on which subsequent CJEU decisions have been based. The CJEU concluded that a national court is not an independent and impartial tribunal within the meaning of the European Union (EU) law where the objective circumstances in which that court was formed, its characteristics, and the means by which its members have been appointed are capable of giving rise to legitimate doubts, in the minds of subjects of the law, as to the imperviousness of that court to external interference. In particular, a court may cease to be seen as independent or impartial when it appears to be under the direct or indirect influence of the legislature and/or the executive, or where doubts emerge about their neutrality with respect to the interests before them. Such circumstances threaten the trust that justice in a democratic society must inspire in subjects of the law.
Publikacja recenzowana / Peer-reviewed publication ; Celem artykułu jest przedstawienie współczesnych dylematów w kwestii zarządzania Internetem jako nowym dobrem wspólnym ludzkości i przykładem tzw. nowych dóbr wspólnych. W ślad za Lawrence'em Lessigiem omówione zostały trzy warstwy Internetu: fizyczna, logiczna i treści. W tym kontekście przedstawiono dokonania Grupy Roboczej ds. Zarządzania Internetem (WGIG) powołanej przez Sekretarza Generalnego ONZ oraz rolę Forum Zarządzania Internetem (IGF). Zaprezentowano rozbieżne preferencje państw w wyborze suwerennego, wielostronnego lub międzyrządowego modelu zarządzania Internetem. W szczególności ukazano przeciwstawne działania USA i Unii Europejskiej oraz Chin i Rosji oraz podkreślanie przez te dwa ostatnie państwa zagadnienia cyberbezpieczeństwa i cybersuwerenności, co prowadzi do ograniczenia wolności słowa w Internecie i treściowej fragmentacji sieci. Autor proponuje wydzielenie kwestii możliwych do regulacji w drodze porozumień międzyrządowych. Zarazem dochodzi do wniosku, iż mechanizmy wielostronnego zarządzania siecią mogą uzyskać legitymację, jeżeli będą bardziej rzetelne i reprezentatywne niż system międzyrządowy. ; The purpose of this article is to present contemporary dilemmas in the management of the Internet as a new common good of mankind and an example of so called "new commons". In the wake of the Lawrence Lessig's writings discussed are the three layers of the Internet: physical, logical and content. In this context, presented are the achievements of the Working Group on Internet Governance (WGIG) initiated by the UN Secretary General and the role of the Internet Governance Forum (IGF). Presented are divergent preferences of states in choosing a sovereign, multi-stakeholder or multilateral model of Internet governance. In particular, the article demonstrates conflicting actions of the US, European Union and China, Russia and issues of cybersecurity and cyber sovereignty highlighted by the latter two countries, which lead to restrictions on freedom of speech in the Internet and fragmentation of the network in its content layer. The author proposes to separate issues for feasible regulation by multilateral agreements. At the same time he concludes that the mechanisms of multilateral network management can gain legitimacy if they are more reliable and representative than the intergovernmental system.
Publikacja recenzowana / Peer-reviewed publication ; Celem artykułu jest przedstawienie i krytyczna analiza dokonań najdłużej działającej misji Organizacji Bezpieczeństwa i Współpracy w Europie – w Skopje. Autor ocenia przyczyny rozmieszczenia misji na tle problemów, z jakimi mierzyła się młoda republika po ogłoszeniu niepodległości w 1991 r., spór z Grecją o nazwę państwa oraz napięte stosunki etniczne z powodu rosnącej liczby obywateli etnicznie albańskiej narodowości. Na tle historycznym ukazane zostały Nowe zadania OBWE po porozumieniu z Ochrydy. Zdaniem autora Misja OBWE w Skopje, pomimo bogatego dorobku, jest nadal raczej świadkiem wydarzeń, niż realną siłą sprawczą zmian w tym bałkańskim państwie. ; The purpose of the article is to present and offer a critical analysis of the achievements of the longest-running mission of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe – in Skopje. The author evaluates the reasons for the deployment of the mission against the background of the problems which the young republic faced after declaring independence in 1991, the dispute with Greece about the name of the country, and the strained ethnic relations with the growing number of citizens of ethnic Albanian nationality. Against the background of the history, the new tasks of the OSCE are presented, following the Ohrid Framework Agreement. The author concludes that the OSCE Mission in Skopje is still rather a witness to the events than a real driving force behind the change despite the significant achievements in the Balkan state.
